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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Rachel Elizabeth Luna appeals from her conviction under Idaho Code § 18-1505 for
exploitation of a vulnerable adult by appropriating $60,000 from the victim’s bank account after
he suffered a stroke and was determined to be unable to make his own decisions, and while Luna
was his agent under authority of a springing power of attorney. She argues the district court erred
in two ways: first, by excluding evidence of particular instances in which the victim had
previously made gifts to her and another woman, and particular instances in which she had
previously accessed his bank account; and second, by instructing the jury that an agent under a
power of attorney does not have lawful authority to use the principal’s assets to make a gift to
herself unless the power of attorney specifically authorizes her to do so.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In May of 2017, officers received a report that Rachel Luna had “befriended Benton
‘Skip’ Hofferber and taken advantage of him.” (PSI, p. 70.) In particular, the report―made by
Shauna Urzua, Mr. Hofferber’s power of attorney at the time the report was made and his
bookkeeper for many years―stated that Mr. Hofferber suffered a stroke, Luna assisted Mr.
Hofferber in selling his home, and then she used her position as Mr. Hofferber’s power of
attorney at that time to make a $60,000 withdrawal from his bank account. (PSI, p. 70; Tr., pp.
175-76. 1) The report also stated that Luna sold a Rolex watch owned by Mr. Hofferber and
retained the $24,000 in proceeds, wrote various checks from Mr. Hofferber’s account, and
purchased a Range Rover. (Id.) In an interview with police, Mr. Hofferber stated that, after he
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The transcript does not include numbered lines.
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suffered a stroke in September of 2016, he “designated Luna as his power of attorney to assist
with daily and personal issues,” but it “turned out that Luna was helping herself, not him.” (PSI,
p. 114.) He stated that he “never received $60,000 in proceeds from the sale of the home” and
“never received the $24,000 from the sale of the watch,” and was “insistent” that Luna was not
entitled to those funds. (Id.) The $60,000 from Mr. Hofferber’s bank account―in the form of a
cashier’s check―was deposited in Luna’s account on May 8, 2017, while the proceeds from the
sale of the watch were deposited in Luna’s account on April 28, 2017. (PSI, p. 129.)
The state charged Luna with two felony counts of exploitation of a vulnerable adult under
Idaho Code § 18-1505(3), alleging that she “exploit[ed] Mr. Benton ‘Skip’ Merrill Hofferber, Jr.,
a vulnerable adult, by taking and/or obtaining proceeds and/or money from Mr. Hofferber” on
April 28, 2017, and May 8, 2017, both times in amounts exceeding $1,000. (R., pp. 41-42.)
Luna filed a motion in limine asking, in relevant part, for the court to rule admissible
“bank statements” allegedly evidencing financial gifts from Mr. Hofferber to Luna, as well as to
“another young woman,” that were “made when Mr. Hofferber was not ‘vulnerable.’” (R., pp.
97-98.) Luna claimed that, “Evidence of this behavior is crucial to Ms. Luna’s defense to show
Mr. Hofferber was not ‘exploited’ regardless of whether he was later deemed ‘vulnerable’ as this
was his normal intent and regular choices.” (R., p. 98.) The district court denied the motion as
untimely under its scheduling order and stated that it would address the issue at trial. (R., p. 96.)
On the first day of trial the district court took up this issue, as well as a number of other
evidentiary issues addressed in Luna’s motion in limine. (Tr., pp. 120-46.) With respect to
evidence of prior gifts, defense counsel argued that “the allegation is that [Luna] basically gave a
gift to herself from his property” and evidence of prior gifts would be relevant “to show what
[Mr. Hofferber’s] intent was” because “this is a case of an older man that gives large gifts to
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young women.” (Tr., pp. 122-24.) Defense counsel also argued that “there was a prior power of
attorney”―executed before the springing power of attorney that became effective in April of
2017 when Mr. Hofferber suffered a stroke and was determined to be incapacitated―pursuant to
which Luna had access to Mr. Hofferber’s bank account and there was evidence that Luna had
accessed it, which evidence she claimed was relevant to show Mr. Hofferber’s “intent” with
respect to the $60,000 she later took from his account in May of 2017. (Tr., pp. 127-32.)
The district court held that the evidence was inadmissible because it was irrelevant,
except as character or propensity evidence.

(Tr., pp. 125-26.) With respect to relevance,

according to the court, “how she exercised those powers [over Mr. Hofferber’s bank account] on
other occasions, or how Mr. Hofferber gave her gifts on other occasions . . . . doesn’t say
anything about whether these were gifts or whether these were appropriate exercises of her
powers granted to her in the written power of attorney guidelines.” (Tr., p. 132.) Following a
break, defense counsel raised the issue again to further address the applicability of I.R.E. 404.
(Tr., pp. 142-48.)

After additional argument, the court agreed with defense counsel that

“generosity is a pertinent trait in a case where the defense is ‘this was a gift’” and so held that
Luna could “introduce evidence of Mr. Hofferber’s character for generosity,” but only “in the
form of opinion or reputation evidence.” (Tr., pp. 143-44, 147.)
A doctor in the intensive care unit at St. Luke’s Hospital testified that Mr. Hofferber was
admitted on April 10, 2017, following a hemorrhagic stroke, was diagnosed with delirium, and
she authored a letter dated April 17, 2017, stating that he was “unable to make decisions” and it
is “necessary” to defer to a power of attorney for decision-making. (Tr., pp. 150-55; State’s Ex.
1.) That determination triggered a springing power of attorney executed by Mr. Hofferber in
March of 2017 that designated Luna as first in line to be Mr. Hofferber’s agent. (State’s Ex. 2.)
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That power of attorney specifically provided that Mr. Hofferber’s agent was not permitted to
make gifts or use his property to benefit herself. (State’s Ex. 2, pp. 5-6. 2)
Shauna Urzua, Mr. Hofferber’s long-time bookkeeper, testified that she became Mr.
Hofferber’s power of attorney in May of 2017 when Luna abruptly resigned. (Tr., pp. 159-69;
State’s Ex. 2, p. 4 (springing power of attorney designating Ms. Urzua as second in line to be
agent); State’s Ex. 3, p. 10 (Luna’s resignation, effective May 15, 2017).) Ms. Urzua was aware
that Mr. Hofferber’s townhouse was being sold and, shortly before Luna’s resignation, asked
Luna whether the proceeds would be placed in a trust for Mr. Hofferber, and was told by Luna
“not to worry about it” and “that she was going to take care of him.” (Tr., pp. 165-66.) After
Luna’s resignation, Ms. Urzua had “concerns” about Mr. Hofferber’s finances and, in particular,
noticed that while roughly $90,000 in proceeds from the sale of Mr. Hofferber’s home had been
deposited in his account, a cashier’s check was immediately issued to Luna in the amount of
$60,000. (Tr., pp. 170-72.) She also testified that Mr. Hofferber had an expensive Rolex watch
that he had intended to sell and she could not locate the proceeds from the sale of that watch.
(Tr., p. 175.)
Bret Tinker, a friend and business associate of Mr. Hofferber’s, testified that he became
concerned about Mr. Hofferber’s finances and where he would be living in the future, attempted
to discuss with Luna, and Luna become defensive. (Tr., pp. 198-200.) He testified that he was
aware that Mr. Hofferber had intended to sell his home and use the proceeds to purchase another
property. (Tr., p. 201.) At the end of the conversation, Luna “left it as she didn’t want to have
anything else to do with Skip and that we needed to take care of it.” (Id.)

2
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Detective Craig Fawley with the Meridian Police Department testified regarding his
investigation. Through his testimony, the state introduced Luna’s bank records, reflecting that
she is the sole signer on two bank accounts opened on April 28, 2017, roughly two weeks after
she become Mr. Hofferber’s agent under the springing power of attorney. (Tr., pp. 221-25;
State’s Ex. 4, pp. 15-18.) One account was funded on that same date with a deposit made with a
check from “Watchworks” in the amount of $24,000. (State’s Ex. 4, pp. 13, 20.) The other
account was funded on May 8, 2017, with the deposit of a $60,000 cashier’s check from Mr.
Hofferber’s bank account. (State’s Ex. 4, pp. 14, 19.)
After the state rested, the district court briefly discussed jury instructions. (Tr., pp. 23941.) Defense counsel stated that he had no objection to the state’s proposed instruction regarding
the definition of “exploit”―taken directly from I.C. § 18-1505(4)(c)―to mean “an action which
may include, but is not limited to, the unjust or improper use of a vulnerable adult’s financial
power of attorney, funds, property or resources by another person for profit or advantage.” (Tr.,
pp. 239-40; R., p. 89.) The court noted that this case focused on whether there had been an
unjust or improper use of a power of attorney, and asked the parties whether they would request
the court to “give the jury instruction on the Uniform Power of Attorney Act.” (Tr., p. 240.) The
prosecutor stated that he would request an instruction that provided, “essentially, the default is
that there is not a power to give gifts unless it’s specifically designated.” (Tr., p. 240.) Defense
counsel stated that he would have to see the instruction before addressing its propriety. (Tr., p.
241.)
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Luna was the only witness for the defense. 3 She testified that she met Mr. Hofferber at
the bar in which she worked in 2014 and the two became close friends. (Tr., pp. 248-50.) She
and her daughter lived in Mr. Hofferber’s home off and on in 2015 and 2016, including after he
suffered his first stroke in September of 2016. (Tr., pp. 250-52.) She testified that, that same
month, Mr. Hofferber purchased her a Rolex watch, she first attempted to sell it locally, but then
sent it to Watchworks, a store in Portland, Oregon, to sell on consignment where it stayed until it
eventually sold in April of 2017 for $24,000. (Tr., pp. 253-62.) She introduced a text message
exchange in which Mr. Hofferber suggested he was going to buy her a Rolex (Defense Ex. F), a
receipt from a jewelry store reflecting that she attempted to sell a Rolex locally in October of
2016 (Defense Ex. D), and a shipping receipt reflecting the cost to ship an item to Portland in
November of 2016 (Defense Ex. E). (Tr., pp. 253-62, 282.)
With respect to the $60,000 from the sale of Mr. Hofferber’s home, she acknowledged
that the house sold while Mr. Hofferber was incapacitated, that the proceeds were $90,000, that
she withdrew $60,000 from his account in the form of a cashier’s check which she deposited in
her personal account to which Mr. Hofferber had no access, and then resigned as power of
attorney two weeks later, telling Mr. Hofferber’s friend who had inquired about the proceeds of
the sale that she was “done” with Mr. Hofferber. (Tr., pp. 267-68, 286-88.) She testified that
Mr. Hofferber’s bank understood that she was acting under authority of a power of
attorney―executed in January of 2017―which granted her access to that account specifically.
(Tr., pp. 269-70; Defense Ex. C.) But she provided no testimony or explanation of any sort

3

After some discussion whether Mr. Hofferber would be competent to testify and how the court
should determine whether he was (Tr., pp. 244-46), Mr. Hofferber did not testify and the record
does not reflect why.
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as to why she believed she might somehow have been entitled to that money, as opposed to how
the bank understood her to it. (See generally Tr., pp. 248-289.) She testified that she resigned as
power of attorney in part because, after the sale of the house, she spoke with Mr. Hofferber by
phone in the hospital and he, “Verbally threatened me that I didn’t care, that I hadn’t been there
for him,” and he “used the word jail.” (Tr., pp. 268-69.)
Following Luna’s testimony, the defense rested and the court held the jury instruction
conference. Instruction No. 14 was the instruction on Count II and provided, in relevant part,
that the jury was required to find that Luna “exploited” Mr. Hofferber by “taking and/or
obtaining proceeds and/or money” from him on or about May 8, 2017, while he was a vulnerable
adult. (R., p. 155.) Instruction No. 15 defined “exploitation” or “exploit” to include “unjust or
improper use of a vulnerable adult’s financial power of attorney, funds, property or resources by
another person for profit or advantage.” (R., p. 156.) Defense counsel had no objection to either
instruction. (Tr., pp. 295-96. 4) Instruction No. 12 provided as follows:
A person (the agent) who has been given a power of attorney by anotherperson (the principal) may give the principal’s money to others if the written
power of attorney expressly grants the agent the power to make gifts of the
principal’s property.
However, the agent may not give the principal’s money or other property
to the agent himself unless the written power of attorney expressly authorizes the
agent to do so.
(R., p. 153.) Asked by defense counsel where the instruction “come[s] from,” the district court
stated that it paraphrased the Uniform Power of Attorney Act and cited, in particular, I.C. § 1512-201. (Tr., pp. 292-93.) Defense counsel objected that “that’s a civil code section, not a

4

Defense counsel did object to the order of the instructions, but not to their substance. (Tr., pp.
295-96.)
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criminal.” (Tr., p. 293.) Asked by the court whether he was contending that it was an incorrect
statement of the law, defense counsel responded only that it “effectively creates it’s [sic] own
crime. You’re taking civil prohibition and turning that into a crime.” (Tr., pp. 293-95.) The
court again clarified that defense counsel agreed that “the instruction is an accurate statement of
the law” and overruled the objection. (Id.) The court suggested that where a central issue was
whether a victim had been exploited through improper use of a power of attorney, it “make[s]
sense that [the jury] understand the lawful use of a power of attorney.” (Tr., p. 294.)
The jury returned a not-guilty verdict on Count I, related to the sale of the watch, and a
guilty verdict on Count II, related to the proceeds from the sale of Mr. Hofferber’s home. (Tr.,
pp. 329-30; R., p. 166.) The district court imposed a fixed term of two years in prison. (Tr., pp.
344-45; R., pp. 178-81.) Luna timely appealed. (R., pp. 188-91.)
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ISSUES
Luna states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err by prohibiting Ms. Luna from presenting evidence
regarding other gifts given by Mr. Hofferber to her and other women, and
regarding checks she wrote pursuant to her power of attorney on Mr.
Hofferber’s bank account?

II.

Did the district court err in instructing the jury regarding the requirements
for gift-giving under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Luna failed to show that the district court committed reversible error by permitting
her to present reputation evidence regarding Mr. Hofferber’s character for generosity and
evidence regarding her authority to access his account, but excluding evidence of specific
instances in which he exhibited that character and specific instances in which Luna
accessed his account prior to his incapacity?

II.

Has Luna failed to show that the district court created a fatal variance by instructing the
jury regarding the conditions under which an agent under a power of attorney may
appropriate the principal’s property?

9

ARGUMENT
I.
Luna Has Failed To Show That The District Court Committed Reversible Error By Excluding
Evidence
A.

Introduction
Luna sought to introduce evidence of specific instances in which Mr. Hofferber gave gifts

to her and another woman (R., pp. 96-98), as well as evidence of specific instances in which she
accessed Mr. Hofferber’s bank account under authority provided by a power of attorney executed
by Mr. Hofferber in January of 2017 (Tr., p. 127; Defense Ex. C, p. 28). According to Luna,
evidence of Mr. Hofferber’s gifts and records of her access to his bank account while he had
capacity were relevant to show that, though he was incapacitated at the time, he might have
“intended” for her to appropriate $60,000 of the $90,000 from the sale of his house. (Tr., pp.
122-23, 129. 5) She argued that Mr. Hofferber “chose to spend his money surrounding himself
with younger women,” was “never a miserly old man who only started writing checks out to
younger women following a stroke,” and “[t]his evidence is necessary for the defense to show
that.” (R., p. 98.)
The district court permitted Luna to present reputation evidence for Mr. Hofferber’s
character for generosity. (Tr., pp. 143-47.) The court also permitted her to introduce both the
power of attorney executed in January of 2017 and testimony regarding Luna’s access to his
account through that power of attorney. (Tr., pp. 130-32, 269-70.) The court excluded only

5

The discussion below also concerned the alleged relevance of the evidence to Count I, related to
the proceeds of the sale of a Rolex watch. The discussion herein focuses on Count II, related to
the $60,000 withdrawn from Mr. Hofferber’s account. Luna was acquitted of Count I. (R., p.
166.) Thus, while the state does not concede error even with respect to Count I, Luna is not
requesting any relief related to that count and any error is necessarily harmless with respect to it.
10

evidence regarding particular gifts Mr. Hofferber had given and specific instances on which Luna
accessed his bank account. (Tr., pp. 125-26, 132, 146-47.)
Luna has not shown that the district court erred. Evidence of Mr. Hofferber’s generosity
with respect to “younger women” while he had capacity is irrelevant to whether Luna acted
improperly by giving herself a $60,000 gift while she was his agent under the springing power of
attorney that became operative in April of 2017 when he was determined to be unable to make
his own decisions. Even assuming his generosity had some relevance, the district court permitted
her to present reputation evidence regarding his character and evidence regarding her access to
his checking account, but properly excluded evidence of specific instances of conduct under
I.R.E. 403, 404, and 405. Finally, if the district court erred, the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision to

admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661,
___, 462 P.3d 1125, 1133 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). The abuse of discretion standard
asks whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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C.

Mr. Hofferber’s Past Generosity And Her Prior Access To Her Account Were Irrelevant
To The Propriety Of Luna’s Conduct While He Was Incapacitated And She Was His
Agent Under The Springing Power Of Attorney
Evidence that is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged is

generally admissible. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008). Evidence
is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Id.; I.R.E. 401.

Evidence that amounts to speculation or conjecture is not relevant and is

therefore not admissible. State v. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 563, 328 P.3d 539, 543 (Ct. App.
2014).
Idaho Code § 18-1505(3) makes it a felony to “exploit[] a vulnerable adult” where “the
monetary damage from such exploitation exceeds one thousand dollars.” “Vulnerable adult” is
defined to mean “a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to protect himself
from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental impairment which affects the
person’s judgment or behavior to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate or implement decisions regarding his person, funds, property or
resources.” I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). Following a stroke in April of 2017, Mr. Hofferber was
declared unable to make his own decisions. (Tr., pp. 153-55.) There has never been any dispute
that he was a “vulnerable adult” in April and May of 2017. (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) “Exploit”
means “an action which may include, but is not limited to, the unjust or improper use of a
vulnerable adult’s financial power of attorney, funds, property or resources by another person for
profit or advantage.” I.C. § 18-1505(4)(c). When Mr. Hofferber was incapacitated by his stroke
in April of 2017, the springing power of attorney became effective and Luna his agent under that
power of attorney. (State’s Ex. 2; Tr., pp. 266-69.) Less than two weeks later, she withdrew
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$60,000 associated with the sale of his home from Mr. Hofferber’s account and deposited it in
her own. (State’s Exs. 3 & 4; Tr., pp. 223-24.) Again, there is no dispute regarding that.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) Just two weeks after that, Luna resigned her position under the
springing power of attorney stating that she was “done” with Mr. Hofferber. (Tr., pp. 208, 28789.) With respect to Count II, the only question before the jury was whether it was “unjust or
improper” for Luna to take $60,000 from Mr. Hofferber while he was incapacitated and she was
his agent under the springing power of attorney.
According to Luna, evidence that Mr. Hofferber gave her gifts and that she had access to
his bank account before he became incapacitated is relevant to show that she did not exploit Mr.
Hofferber. (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) That is so, she claims, because it purportedly shows that
“this was his normal intent and regular choices.” (Id.) Luna’s position appears to be that Mr.
Hofferber’s prior generosity could somehow make it reasonable to conclude that it was just and
proper for her to take $60,000 from his account while he was vulnerable and incapacitated, and
while she was his agent under the springing power of attorney.
That position has no merit. That a vulnerable adult was generous prior to a period of
incapacity obviously does not give the vulnerable adult’s agent carte blanche to empty the
adult’s bank account for her own benefit. Mr. Hofferber’s history of giving gifts and Luna’s
access to his account while he had capacity has nothing to do with propriety of Luna’s conduct as
his agent under the springing power of attorney while Mr. Hofferber was incapacitated and, in
particular, in no way suggests that she could properly help herself to $60,000 of the $90,000 from
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the sale of his home. 6 Because Mr. Hofferber’s prior generosity has nothing to do with
the
propriety of her actions as his agent while he was incapacitated, evidence with respect to his
generosity was entirely irrelevant to whether Luna’s conduct was unjust or improper. (See Tr., p.
132 (district court noting that history of gift giving and permitting Luna to access his account
“doesn’t say anything” about whether taking $60,000 from him was an “appropriate exercise[] of
her powers”).)
That conclusion follows not only from common-sense, but from Idaho law and the
explicit terms of the springing power of attorney that became effective when Mr. Hofferber was
incapacitated. The springing power of attorney naming Luna as Mr. Hofferber’s agent when he
became incapacitated specifically provided that Luna did not have authority to give gifts.
(State’s Ex. 2, pp. 5-6.) It further provided that, “An agent that is not my ancestor, spouse, or
descendant MAY NOT use my property to benefit the agent or a person to whom the agent owes
an obligation of support unless I have included that authority in the Special Instructions.”
(State’s Ex. 2, p. 6 (capitalization original).)

The Special Instructions did not provide

Luna―who is not Mr. Hofferber’s ancestor, spouse, or descendant―any such authority. (Id.) It
follows that Luna’s conduct was not “proper.” Where a power of attorney specifically provides
that the agent does not have authority to give gifts or to use the principal’s property to benefit the
agent, it is absurd to suggest that it is nevertheless just and proper for the agent to take $60,000

6

Evidence of gifts from Mr. Hofferber to some other women is even more obviously irrelevant to
the question whether it was improper or unjust for Luna to raid Mr. Hofferber’s account while he
was incapacitated.
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from the principal and deposit it in her bank account while the principal is incapacitated. The
extent to which the principal was generous during periods where he was competent to make
financial decisions changes nothing and so is irrelevant. See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1399 (March
2021 Update) (“A power of attorney cannot be added to, varied, or contradicted by parol
evidence. For example, an attorney-in-fact cannot rely on an alleged oral authorization for selfdealing gifts where the power of attorney agreement itself expressly prohibits such gifts.”
(footnotes omitted)).
In addition, in Idaho, as in many states, a power of attorney is strictly construed and must
explicitly authorize the agent to give gifts and self-deal in order for such conduct to be a proper
exercise of the agent’s authority. See Matter of Est. of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 473, 432 P.3d 6,
22 (2018) (holding that “a power of attorney must be strictly construed” and that gifts were
improper under power of attorney that was not explicit with respect to power to give gifts).
Under I.C. § 15-12-201(1), an agent under a power of attorney may give gifts from the principal’s
property only if explicitly authorized to do so by the power of attorney. Under I.C. § 15-12201(2), even where the power of attorney explicitly authorizes the giving of gifts, an agent may
not “exercise authority under a power of attorney to create in the agent . . . an interest in the
principal’s property” unless there is a separate and explicit authorization in the power of attorney
to do so. Even if the springing power of attorney here had been silent regarding Luna’s ability to
convey an interest in Mr. Hofferber’s property to herself, a “history of generosity” would have
been “irrelevant” to whether Luna acted improperly in doing so. Townsend v. United States, 889
F. Supp. 369, 374 (D. Neb. 1995). See also, e.g., Kunewa v. Joshua, 924 P.2d 559, 565 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1996) (“Where a power of attorney does not expressly authorize the attorney-in-fact to
make gifts to himself or herself, extrinsic evidence of the principal’s intent to allow such gifts is
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not admissible.”); Praefke v. Am. Enter. Life Ins. Co., 655 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002) (“because the power of attorney did not expressly authorize Praefke to make gifts to
herself, extrinsic evidence of Glasslein’s intent to allow such gifts is not admissible”).
For that same reason, Mr. Hofferber’s history of generosity is irrelevant even if Luna
intended to argue that the power of attorney executed in January of 2017―after Mr. Hofferber’s
first stroke but before his second―permitted her to appropriate the $60,000. The January 2017
power of attorney also did not provide that Luna could make gifts to herself from Mr. Hofferber’s
property. (Defense Ex. C.) Instead, it merely authorized her access to the account. That an
agent under a power of attorney has access to an account obviously does not imply that the
manner of their accessing it, particularly while the principal lacks capacity, is just and proper.
The contrary view would make a prosecution under I.C. § 18-1505(3) impossible anytime the
agent under a power of attorney used access to the principal’s account to appropriate funds from
a vulnerable adult; on that view, so long as the document provides access. That is, it would
virtually read out of the definition of “exploitation” the language regarding improper use of a
power of attorney.
Indeed, notwithstanding her prior motion in limine, Luna later seems to have concluded
herself that the fact that she had access to his account under a power of attorney in no way
suggests that the manner of her access was just and proper. Ms. Urzua testified that when she
took over from Luna as Mr. Hofferber’s power of attorney and was able to view the transactions
on his account, she became concerned with some of the transactions, including for trips to
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“Cactus Pete’s.” (Tr., pp. 170-71. 7) Defense counsel objected “based on prior rulings” and the
court sustained that objection. (Id.) It seems Luna herself concluded that evidence of her access
to Mr. Hofferber’s account was relevant, at best, to show that she had a pattern of acting unjustly
and improperly by accessing Mr. Hofferber’s account to benefit herself. State v. Griffith, 110
Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 1986) (“A defendant may not request a particular
ruling by the trial court and later argue on appeal that the ruling was erroneous.”).
But even if the January 2017 power of attorney had authorized such self-dealing, the
later-executed and springing power of attorney, which was operative when she withdrew the
$60,000 and deposited it in her own account, still would have rendered her conduct unjust and
improper. See I.C. § 15-12-201(1) (“An agent under a power of attorney may exercise the
following authority on behalf of the principal or with the principal’s property only if the power of
attorney expressly grants the agent the authority and exercise is not otherwise prohibited by other
agreement or instrument to which the authority or property is subject . . . .” (emphasis added)).
The springing power of attorney informed Luna that she was to “[d]o nothing beyond the
authority granted in this power of attorney,” which specifically prohibited her from giving gifts
or using Mr. Hofferber property to benefit herself. (State’s Ex. 2, pp. 3-6.)
Mr. Hofferber was incapacitated and unable to make his own decisions. Common-sense

7

Though not presented at trial, there was evidence that Luna used her access to Mr. Hofferber’s
account to fund a significant gambling problem, including after he suffered his second stroke,
and also used the money that she deposited in her own account from the sale of his home. (See,
e.g., Tr., pp. 335-36; PSI, pp. 127-28, 131 (“Documents provided by Cactus Petes [sic] indicate
Luna spent hundreds of thousands of dollars gambling at the Casinos), 272-73, 451-54.)
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dictates that it was not just and proper to take that opportunity to divest him of $60,000. The
springing power of attorney under which Luna was Mr. Hofferber’s agent at that time explicitly
precluded her from giving gifts or personally benefiting from his property, much less
appropriating $60,000. Further, Idaho law unambiguously provides that an agent under a power
of attorney may not benefit from the principal’s property absent explicit authorization, which was
lacking in both powers of attorney at issue here. It follows that her conduct was unjust or
improper and that she exploited Mr. Hofferber while he was a vulnerable adult, no matter how
generous Mr. Hofferber was while he had capacity. Mr. Hofferber prior history of generosity and
Luna’s access to his account was irrelevant to Luna’s defense.
D.

Even Assuming Mr. Hofferber’s Prior History Of Generosity Was Somehow Relevant,
The District Court Did Not Err By Excluding Evidence Regarding Particular Instances Of
Gift Giving
Below, Luna stated that she wanted to introduce specific instances on which Mr.

Hofferber gave a gift to show that Mr. Hofferber was not “someone who was a miser that didn’t
share with Ms. Luna, and, then, all of a sudden she gets the power of attorney and she starts
emptying his account.” (Tr., pp. 122-23.) She argued that that evidence was admissible under
I.R.E. 404 to show that he is “someone who’s a very generous person continuing to be generous.”
(Tr., pp. 142-43.)

Though the district court initially rejected that argument, it eventually

permitted Luna to present “evidence of Mr. Hofferber’s character for generosity” and excluded
only evidence of “specific instances of conduct.” (Tr., pp. 143-47.) On appeal, Luna relies on
I.R.E. 404(a)(2)(B) to argue that the district court abused its discretion. (Appellant’s brief, p.
13.)
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Even assuming Mr. Hofferber’s past generosity was somehow relevant, it was not an
abuse of discretion to exclude evidence regarding specific instances of generosity. “Evidence of
a person’s character or trait of character is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” I.R.E. 404(a)(1). I.R.E. 404(a)(2)(B)
provides an exception and permits a defendant to “offer evidence of an alleged victim’s pertinent
trait of character.” But, even under that exception, evidence of an alleged victim’s pertinent trait
of character must be evidence in the form of “testimony about the person’s reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion.” I.R.E. 405(a). “Idaho Rule of Evidence 405 provides that
character evidence may usually be admitted only as testimony in the form of an opinion or
testimony as to reputation, but on cross-examination, a party may inquire about relevant specific
instances of conduct.” State v. Samuel, 165 Idaho 746, 769, 452 P.3d 768, 791 (2019) (quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis original). It is only where “a person’s character trait is an essential
element of a charge, claim, or defense” that “the character or trait” may be “proved by relevant
specific instances of the person’s conduct.” I.R.E. 405(b).
Luna did not argue below (and has not argued on appeal) that whether Mr. Hofferber was
generous was an “essential element” of any charge, claim, or defense and so evidence of specific
instances of generosity was admissible under I.R.E. 405(b). State v. Briggs, 162 Idaho 736, 73839, 404 P.3d 1287, 1289-90 (Ct. App. 2017) (noting that “issues not raised below may not be
considered for the first time on appeal” and declining, even as fundamental error, to consider
argument that evidence should have been admitted under rule not cited to the district court
below). And any such argument would have failed had she bothered to make it. It is unclear
what Luna’s defense was, precisely, but it was seemingly either that the $60,000 was gifted to her
or that she was entitled to take the $60,000 by authority of the first power of attorney, executed in
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January 2017. Neither defense in any way hinges on the proposition that Mr. Hofferber had been
generous in the past. Non-generous people sometimes give gifts and Mr. Hofferber’s generosity
has nothing to do with whatever authority was granted Luna under the January 2017 power of
attorney. See State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 920, 436 P.3d 1252, 1269 (2019) (holding that
while evidence that the victim had been aggressive and violent on prior occasions was relevant to
self-defense and claim that victim was initial aggressor, it was not “essential” to that defense
because a person who was historically non-violent and non-aggressive could, on a particular
occasion, be the initial aggressor, and the fact that someone was historical violent and aggressive
does not prove that he was the initial aggressor on a particular occasion); United States v.
Manfredi, No. CRIM. 07-352, 2009 WL 3762966, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2009) (holding that
traits of honesty, integrity, truthfulness, and generosity were not “essential elements” of defense
in prosecution for tax evasion and filing false tax returns).
Finally, the district court gave an additional and alternative ground for excluding specific
instances evidence, which ground Luna does not address on the merits. Schmidt v. Huston, 167
Idaho 320, ___, 470 P.3d 1129, 1134 (2016) (“Where a lower court makes a ruling based on two
alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the appellate court
must affirm on the uncontested basis.”) In discussing the issue below, the district court indicated
that the evidence would also be excluded under I.R.E. 403. (Tr., pp. 126, 143-44.) On appeal,
addressing only one of these two references, Luna suggests in a footnote that it was a mistake and
the district court intended to refer to I.R.E. 404. (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 n.3.) That is so, she
claims, because the court stated that the evidence was “character evidence and that is what Rule
403 bars.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 (quoting Tr., p. 126).) According to Luna, the reference to
I.R.E. 403 must be a mistake because the district court had already determined the evidence was
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not relevant, and so no balancing under I.R.E. 403 was appropriate, and because I.R.E. 403 does
not bar character evidence. Focusing only on that single reference, it might be plausible that the
district court made a misstatement. Not so, though, in the context of the district court’s second
reference to I.R.E. 403, which Luna does not address. Though the district court continued to be
deeply skeptical of the relevance of Mr. Hofferber’s character for generosity, it later ruled that
she could present opinion or reputation evidence, but excluded evidence of “specific instances”
and cited both Rules 404 and 403. (Tr., pp. 143-44.) It appears the court judged the issue of Mr.
Hofferber’s generosity to be minimally relevant, if relevant at all, permitted Luna to present
reputation or opinion evidence regarding his character, but excluded the evidence of specific
instances at issue on appeal on two alternative grounds: (1) because evidence regarding specific
instances in which a character trait was manifested is generally not admissible, as discussed
above; and, (2) because whatever minimal probative value it had would be substantially
outweighed under I.R.E. 403.

While I.R.E. 403 does not explicitly and categorically bar

character evidence of any sort, it can certainly bar character evidence in particular cases. See,
e.g., Samuel, 165 Idaho at 770, 452 P.3d at 792 (where district court cited both I.R.E. 404 and
I.R.E. 403 to exclude evidence of specific instances of a particular character trait, affirming on
the basis of I.R.E. 403). Assuming arguendo that evidence of Mr. Hofferber’s generosity was
relevant, it was minimally relevant and its probative value was substantially outweighed by its
needlessly cumulative nature and the danger of undue delay and wasting time. The court had
already determined Luna could present reputation and opinion evidence regarding Mr.
Hofferber’s character for generosity, as well as her access to his bank account under the January
2017 power of attorney. Evidence of particular gifts would add nothing except delay.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of specific occasions
on which Mr. Hofferber gave Luna a gift. It was proper to exclude that evidence not only under
I.R.E. 404 and 405, but also under I.R.E. 403.
E.

Even If The District Court Erred, The Error Was Harmless
“[U]nder the harmless error doctrine, error in the admission or exclusion of evidence will

not result in a reversal if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Aguilar,
154 Idaho 201, 204, 296 P.3d 407, 410 (Ct. App. 2012). “Harmless error is error unimportant in
relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.”
Garcia, 166 Idaho at ___, 462 P.3d at 1138 (quotation marks omitted). “When the effect of the
error is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’ without the error, it can be said that the error did not contribute to the verdict
rendered and is therefore harmless.” Id.
If the district court erred, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The district
court permitted Luna to present evidence both that Mr. Hofferber was “generous” and that he
permitted her access to his bank account. Ms. Urzua, Mr. Hofferber’s long-time bookkeeper and
power of attorney after Luna resigned, testified that he could be “generous” and he was “more
frequently in the last few years” generous “towards young women.” (Tr., p. 182.) Luna likewise
testified that she “receive[d]” Mr. Hofferber’s “generosity” immediately after they became
friends in 2014 and throughout their relationship. (Tr., pp. 249-51.) She testified that she had
access to Mr. Hofferber’s bank account via the January 2017 power of attorney (Tr., pp. 269-70),
which was also admitted (Tr., p. 247; Defense Ex. C).
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In fact, notwithstanding the district court’s ruling, the jury heard considerable evidence
regarding specific instances of Mr. Hofferber’s generosity. Luna testified that she “regularly”
accessed Mr. Hofferber’s bank account. (Tr., pp. 269-70.) She testified that, shortly after she
met Mr. Hofferber in 2014, they were taking trips and vacations together and that she and her
daughter lived with him on and off beginning in December of 2015. (Tr., pp. 248-53.) She
testified that he took a trip to Arizona to try to sell a “condo” that “he had purchased for
somebody else.” (Tr., pp. 264-65.) Mr. Hofferber’s friend, Bret Tinker, testified that Mr.
Hofferber traded in a Mercedes for a Range Rover for Luna to drive because that was something
that Luna wanted. (Tr., pp. 206-07.) And, of course, there was evidence and testimony that Mr.
Hofferber gave Luna a Rolex watch that she later sold for $24,000 (Defense Exs. D-F; Tr., pp.
253-52), evidence that the jury apparently credited as it acquitted her of Count I.
In light of all of that evidence, in addition to the extraordinarily minimal (in fact, nonexistent) probative value of evidence regarding Mr. Hofferber’s generosity and Luna’s access to
his account, the exclusion of more evidence that Mr. Hofferber was generous and permitted Luna
to access his bank account was not harmful. See State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 867, 332 P.3d
767, 779 (2014) (holding that where the “essential thrust” of improperly excluded evidence was
“cumulative” of evidence admitted, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt);
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 401, 871 P.2d 814, 818 (1994) (“Even if the evidence
may have been erroneously excluded, the exclusion is a harmless error if the evidence is merely
cumulative.”).
And, again, Luna herself seems to have concluded that evidence regarding her access to
Mr. Hofferber’s bank account prior to his being declared incapacitated was not helpful to her
defense. According to the police report―not introduced at trial―Mr. Hofferber stated that he
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executed the January 2017 power of attorney so Luna could “assist with daily and personal
issues.” (PSI, p. 114.) In discussing the evidence of Luna’s access to Mr. Hofferber’s account,
the district court characterized it as evidence of access for such purposes.

(Tr., p. 129

(characterizing it as evidence that “she paid his water bill”).) Defense counsel did not correct
that characterization, but simply argued that the January 2017 power of attorney itself should be
admitted. (Id.) When the state later began to inquire about her access to the account to fund trips
to “Cactus Pete’s,” defense counsel objected to the introduction of that evidence based on “prior
rulings.” (Tr., pp. 170-71.) It seems counsel determined that, where the issue was whether Luna
was exploiting Mr. Hofferber, evidence that she was using her access to his account to fund
gambling trips was more harmful than helpful. Griffith, 110 Idaho at 614, 716 P.2d at 1386 (“A
defendant may not request a particular ruling by the trial court and later argue on appeal that the
ruling was erroneous.”).

At any rate, there is certainly no evidence that Luna was ever

permitted―while Mr. Hofferber had capacity―to withdraw as much as $60,000 from Mr.
Hofferber’s account to take as her own.
On appeal, to suggest that the alleged error was not harmless, Luna points to the fact that
the jury acquitted her on Count I, related to the sale of the Rolex, and speculates that it might
have done the same on Count II, related to the $60,000 from the sale of the house, if it had heard
the excluded evidence. (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) In addition to the fact that she does not
address the cumulative nature of the excluded evidence, Count I and the evidence related to it
provide a useful contrast with Count II, demonstrating why the alleged error is harmless. As
noted above, there was evidence at trial that Mr. Hofferber gave Luna the Rolex watch as a gift
well before April of 2017, when he was deemed incapacitated and the springing power of
attorney became effective. (Defense Exs. D-F; Tr., pp. 253-52.) In acquitting on Count I, the
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jury apparently concluded that the sale of the Rolex involved only the sale of an item that was
given to Luna when Mr. Hofferber had the capacity to make the decision to do so, before he was
judged to be incapacitated, before the springing power of attorney was effective, which sale had
nothing to do with any power of attorney. It was only the sale of that property―which was then
hers―that occurred during the period of Mr. Hofferber’s incapacity.
By contrast, Mr. Hofferber’s home sold and $60,000 of the $90,000 from that sale were
taken by Luna from his bank account during the period that Mr. Hofferber was deemed to lack
capacity and while Luna was his agent under the springing power of attorney. (Tr., pp. 267-68,
286-88; State’s Ex. 4, pp. 14, 19.) She then resigned her position as his power of attorney two
weeks later, after Mr. Hofferber angrily confronted her by phone and mentioned “jail,” and she
stated that she was “done” with Mr. Hofferber. (Id.) Though Luna testified, she did not provide
any evidence, explanation, or theory as to why she would have been entitled to the $60,000 from
Mr. Hofferber’s bank account. (See generally Tr., pp. 148-289.) She testified only that when she
withdrew the amount, the bank was under the impression that she was operating under authority
of the January 2017 power of attorney. (Tr., pp. 269-70; Defense Ex. C.) Likewise, in closing
argument, though defense counsel argued at length that the Rolex watch had been given to Luna
prior to Mr. Hofferber’s incapacity, he did not argue in any way that Luna was somehow entitled
to $60,000 from the proceeds of the sale of the house. (Tr., pp. 315-25.) Instead, he stated that
Luna “always operated” under the January 2017 power of attorney, and had “access to everything
already,” before Mr. Hofferber was incapacitated and the springing power of attorney became
effective. (Tr., pp. 319-20.)
Unlike the Rolex, Luna did not claim any particular entitlement to the $60,000 from the
sale of Mr. Hofferber’s home, but instead appeared to argue that because she had access to his
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bank account through the January 2017 power of attorney, taking the $60,000 while Mr.
Hofferber was incapacitated and she was his agent under the springing power of attorney was
neither unjust nor improper. As discussed above in Section I.C, that is incorrect as a legal matter.
No evidence regarding Mr. Hofferber’s prior generosity or Luna’s prior access to his account
would change that. But, in addition, as discussed above, the jury had the 2017 power of attorney
and had testimony from Luna that she regularly accessed the account. (Tr., pp. 247, 269-70;
Defense Ex. C). The jury did not reject her defense to Count II because there was inadequate
evidence that she had access to Mr. Hofferber’s account and regularly used it.
Even if it was error to exclude evidence of particular instances of Mr. Hofferber’s
generosity or of Luna’s access to Mr. Hofferber’s account, there is no reasonable doubt that the
error was harmless.
II.
Luna Has Not Shown That The District Court Created A Fatal Variance By Providing A Legally
Correct Instruction Regarding The Authority Of An Agent Under A Power Of Attorney
A.

Introduction
Over defense counsel’s objection, the district court gave the following jury instruction as

Instruction No. 12:
A person (the agent) who has been given a power of attorney by another
person (the principal) may give the principal’s money to others if the written
power of attorney expressly grants the agent the power to make gifts of the
principal’s property.
However, the agent may not give the principal’s money or other property
to the agent himself unless the written power of attorney expressly authorizes the
agent to do so.
(R., p. 153.) That instruction paraphrases I.C. § 15-12-201, a section of the Uniform Power of
Attorney Act. Defense counsel’s objection was not that the instruction misstated the law; the
district court repeatedly asked whether counsel was suggesting that it was inaccurate as a
26

statement of law, and he declined to do so. (Tr., pp. 293-95.) Instead, the objection was that the
“instruction effectively creates it’s [sic] own crime. You’re taking civil prohibition and turning
that into a crime.” (Tr., pp. 293-94.) The court overruled that objection, noting that where the
allegation was that Luna had exploited Mr. Hofferber by making unjust or improper use of a
power of attorney, it was appropriate for the jury to be instructed regarding an agent’s legal
authority under a power of attorney. (Tr., pp. 294-95.)
On appeal, Luna argues that the instruction created a variance because the Information
did not allege that she exploited Mr. Hofferber “by giving a gift to herself, as an agent from a
principal, in contravention of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act,” but instead alleged that she
exploited Mr. Hofferber “by taking from him money in excess of $1,000.” (Appellant’s brief, p.
19.) Luna is incorrect.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether the jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the

applicable law is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises free review. State v.
Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask
whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable
law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. App. 1993). Whether there
is a variance between a charging document and the evidence and jury instructions at trial is a
question of law given free review on appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 57, 951 P.2d 1283,
1284 (Ct. App. 1998). Likewise, whether such a variance is fatal to the conviction is given free
review. Id.
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C.

There Was No Variance Between The Jury Instruction And The Information, Much Less
A Fatal Variance
“Jury instructions should match the allegations in the charging document as to the means

by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the charged crime.” State v. Bernal, 164
Idaho 190, 194, 427 P.3d 1, 5 (2018). “Failure to do so creates a variance.” Id. “A variance
becomes fatal when it violates due process. In other words, it depends on whether or not the
basic functions of the notice pleading requirement have been met.” Id. (citations, quotation
marks, and brackets omitted). “A variance between a charging instrument and a jury instruction
necessitates reversal only when it deprives the defendant of the right to fair notice or leaves him
or her open to the risk of double jeopardy.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The notice element
requires this Court to determine whether the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the
preparation or presentation of his or her defense.” Id.
There was no variance between the Information and the jury instructions. In Count II of
the Information, the state alleged that:
on or about the 8th day of May 2017, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, [Luna]
did exploit Mr. Benton “Skip” Merrill Hofferber, Jr., a vulnerable adult, by taking
and/or obtaining proceeds and/or money from Mr. Hofferber, where the monetary
damage from such exploitation exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(R., p. 42.) Instruction No. 14 provided that:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Exploitation of a Vulnerable Adult as
alleged in Count II, the state must prove each of the following:
On or about the 8th day May, 2017
In the state of Idaho
The defendant, Rachel Luna,
exploited, Benton “Skip” Merrill Hofferber, Jr., by taking and/or
obtaining proceeds and/or money from Mr. Hofferber,
5. who was at that time a vulnerable adult, and
6. the monetary damage from the exploitation exceeded one thousand
dollars ($1,000).
1.
2.
3.
4.
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If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find
the defendant not guilt. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
(R., p. 155.) Instruction No. 15, to which Luna also had no objection, then provided the statutory
definitions of “vulnerable adult” and “exploited,” with the latter defined to mean “an action
which may include, but is not limited to, the unjust or improper use of a vulnerable adult’s
financial power of attorney, funds, property or resources by another person for profit or
advantage.” (R., p. 156.) Instruction No. 14―the elements instruction for Count II―directly
mirrors Count II of the Information and Luna had no substantive objection to it. 8
Nevertheless, as she did below, and without citing any cases in support, Luna argues that
Instruction No. 12 “created a variance” because it “effectively creates its own crime by taking a
civil prohibition and turning it into a crime.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20 (quotation marks
omitted).)

There is no reasonable way to read the jury instructions that supports Luna’s

argument. Instruction No. 12 would “create a new crime” only if the jury was instructed that it
could convict Luna by making some finding. Instruction No. 12 does not do so. Instead,
Instruction No. 14 instructs the jury regarding the findings required to convict. The jury was not
even instructed that, for purpose of interpreting “unjust or improper” as that phrase appears in
Instruction No. 15, which in turn informs the meaning of “exploited” in Instruction No. 14, the
jury should conclude that Luna made an unjust or improper use of a power of attorney if she took
property from the principal while she was Mr. Hofferber’s agent under a power of attorney that
did not authorize her to do so. The jury instructions matched the information with respect to the
“means” by which Luna was alleged to have violated I.C. § 18-1505. (Compare R., p. 42, with

8

Defense counsel did object to the order of the instructions, but not to their substance. (Tr., pp.
295-96.)
29

R., p. 155.) It follows that there is no variance. Compare State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 339-42,
256 P.3d 735, 747-50 (2018) (finding a fatal variance where defendant was alleged to have
committed lewd and lascivious conduct by oral-to-genital contact, but the jury was instructed in a
manner that permitted it to find the defendant guilty if it found defendant made contact of a
different nature with the victim, and indeed to find him guilty if it found he made contact with
the victim of a nature that would not even constitute lewd and lascivious conduct).
Notably, Luna does not claim that she was somehow unaware that her position as power
of attorney was at issue in determining whether she exploited Mr. Hofferber. (See R., p. 96
(Luna’s motion in limine representing that the state was alleging “the exploitation occurred
because Ms. Luna had a fiduciary duty not benefit [sic] from her position as the POA”).) Instead,
Luna’s complaint concerns the district court’s reliance on the Uniform Power of Attorney Act to
craft Instruction No. 12. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-20.) She argues that she was prejudiced
because she did not realize she would have “to defend her actions as proper under the Uniform
Power of Attorney Act” and “counsel was not even aware of the requirements for gift-giving
contained in the Act prior to the jury instruction conference.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 21.) Luna’s
argument is premised on an absurdly demanding and unrealistic pleading standard that is contrary
to existing law.

“A legally sufficient information is a plain, concise, and definite written

statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” State v. Herreman-Garcia, 160
Idaho 642, 646, 377 P.3d 1105, 1109 (Ct. App. 2016). The state is not required to individually
list in the information every statute, regulation, or case standing for any proposition of law that
might be helpful or relevant for the jury to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence. It does
not create a variance, much less a fatal variance, that defense counsel was apparently unaware of
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applicable law in Idaho regarding what an agent under a power of attorney is or is not legally
authorized to do.
For similar reasons, Luna is incorrect that Instruction No. 12 somehow “lowered the
State’s burden of proving an essential element of exploitation.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) In the
first place, as discussed above, the jury was properly instructed that it must find that she
“exploited” Mr. Hofferber as that term was defined―again, correctly―by Instruction No. 15.
So, the jury was being asked whether Luna exploited Mr. Hofferber by taking $60,000 from him
on May 8, including whether it was “unjust or improper” for her to do so as his agent under a
power of attorney. It is clearly relevant (even if not dispositive) whether the power of attorney
legally authorized her to take $60,000 from him and deposit it in her own account. See, e.g.,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “improper” as “1. Incorrect; unsuitable or
irregular. 2. Fraudulent or otherwise wrongful.”); State v. Columbus, No. C4-00-1950, 2001 WL
950097, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2001) (looking to civil statute governing the fiduciary
duties of an agent under a power of attorney for purposes of criminal prosecution for financial
exploitation of a vulnerable adult). Instruction No. 12 did not “lower” any burden of proof; it
simply instructed the jury regarding a correct legal proposition relevant to the question whether
Luna’s conduct was improper or unjust.
In addition, it is a mistake to suggest, as Luna does, that Instruction No. 12 somehow
improperly imported the civil law into a criminal case, making criminal what was merely civilly
improper conduct. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-20.) It is hardly unique that a civil statute informs
the application of a criminal statute. See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 150 Idaho 278, 280, 246 P.3d
387, 389 (2010) (applying UCC principles to define the scope of a theft statute); State v. Dix,
166 Idaho 851, 465 P.3d 1090, 1094 (2020) (same). The legislative history of I.C. § 18-1505
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shows that is exactly what was intended.

That statute was amended in 2008 by H.B. 442,

changing the definition of “exploitation” from “an action which may include, but is not limited
to, the misuse of a vulnerable adult’s funds, property or resources by another person for profit or
advantage,” to read (as it does now), “an action which may include, but is not limited to, the
unjust or improper use of a vulnerable adult’s financial power of attorney, funds, property or
resources by another person for profit or advantage.” 2008 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 209 (H.B. 442).
In the discussion of the amendment before the House Judiciary, Rules, and Administration
Committee, the bill’s sponsor stated that the amendment was necessary because, while:
misuse of a vulnerable adult’s financial power of attorney certainly qualifies as
exploitation of the vulnerable adult, when these cases are reported to law
enforcement and county prosecutors, they are often improperly characterized by
law enforcement, city attorneys, and county prosecutors as civil matters not
subject to criminal prosecution.
H.B. 442, H. Jud. R. & Admin. Comm. Minutes, 59th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho Feb. 13,
2008). Likewise, a witness from the Idaho Commission on Aging testified that the bill was
necessary to clarify that “misuse of a financial power of attorney is one type of action included in
the definition of exploitation.” Id. In the Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee, witnesses again
explained that the bill was necessary to clarify that misuse of a power of attorney be considered a
“criminal matter” and not a “civil matter,” and, when asked why the term “improper” was
employed, the explanation was that it was used “to cover as many circumstances as possible.”
H.B. 442, S. Jud. & R. Comm. Minutes, 59th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho March 10, 2008). The
statutory language was added precisely to clarify that it is a criminal matter, not a civil matter,
when an agent uses a power of attorney in a manner that exceeds the scope of authority provided
under law and to benefit the agent to the detriment of a vulnerable principal.

32

As the district court recognized, it was perfectly reasonable and appropriate given the
allegations and evidence in the case for the jury to understand whether and under what conditions
an agent under a power of attorney is legally authorized to give herself the principal’s property.
(Tr., p. 294.) Instruction No. 12 did not create a variance because it did not criminalize any
conduct. Instead, regarding the condition under which it could convict, the jury was instructed
by Instruction No. 15 in conformity with the Information. Neither was Instruction No. 12 a
mistaken statement of law, inapplicable, or otherwise erroneous. Rather, it provided a legally
correct instruction regarding the authority of an agent under a power of attorney, which
proposition of law was directly relevant to the question before the jury―whether Luna’s conduct
as Mr. Hofferber’s agent was unjust or improper.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Luna’s judgment of conviction.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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